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|Type of Decision:||Judgement and Sentence|
|Date of Decision:||02-09-1998|
|Articles:||Statute-ICTR-3 / Statute-ICTR-4 / Statute-ICTR-20 / Rules-ICTR-40 / Rules-ICTR-62 / Rules-ICTR-66 / Rules-ICTR-73 / Rules-ICTR-84 / Rules-ICTR-85 / Rules-ICTR-89 / Rules-ICTR-90|
|Keywords:||Arrest Warrant / Indictment / Rights Of The Accused|
|Reference to case-law:|
|ALC:||Volume 2, p. 539-554|
|Paragraphs:||9 - 47|
1.4.1. Procedural Background
9. Jean-Paul Akayesu was arrested in Zambia on 10 October 1995. On 22 November 1995, the Prosecutor of the Tribunal, pursuant to Rule 40 of the Rules, requested the Zambian authorities to keep Akayesu in detention for a period of 90 days, while awaiting the completion of the investigation.
10. On 13 February 1996, the then Prosecutor, Richard Goldstone , submitted an Indictment against Akayesu, which was subsequently amended on 17 June 1997. It contains a total of 15 counts covering genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of Article 3 Common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II of 1977 thereto. More specifically, Akayesu was individually charged with genocide, complicity in genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, extermination, murder, torture, cruel treatment, rape, other inhumane acts and outrages upon personal dignity, which he allegedly committed in Taba commune of which he was the bourgmestre at the time of the alleged acts.
11. The Indictment was confirmed and an arrest warrant, accompanied by an order for continued detention, was issued by Judge William H. Sekule on 16 February 1996. The following week, the Indictment was submitted by the Registrar to the Zambian authorities, to be served upon the Accused. Akayesu was transferred to the Detention Facilities of the Tribunal in Arusha on 26 May 1996, where he is still detained awaiting judgment.
12. The initial appearance of the Accused, pursuant to Rule 62 of the Rules, took place on 30 May 1996 in the presence of his counsel before Trial Chamber I, composed of Judge Laity Kama, presiding, Judge Lennart Aspegren and Judge Navanethem Pillay. The prosecution team, led by Honoré Rakotomanana , Deputy Prosecutor of the Tribunal, was composed of Yacob Haile-Mariam, Mohamed Chande Othman and Pierre-Richard Prosper . The Accused pleaded not guilty to all the counts against him. On the same date, the Chamber ordered the continued detention of the Accused while awaiting his trial . Simultaneous interpretation in French and English, and where necessary Kinyarwanda, was provided at the hearings.
13. The Accused having been found indigent by the Tribunal, in accordance with the provisions of the Directive on Assignment of Defence Counsel , the Registrar of the Tribunal assigned Johan Scheers as defence counsel for the Accused and counsel's fees were paid by the Tribunal. By a decision of 31 October 1996, the Chamber directed the Registrar of the Tribunal to withdraw the assignment of Johan Scheers as defence counsel for Akayesu, pursuant to Article 19 of the Directive on Assignment of Defence Counsel, and to immediately assign Michael Karnavas as the new defence counsel for the Accused. In the same decision, the Chamber postponed the trial until 9 January 1997, at the request of the Accused . On 20 November 1996, the Chamber granted a request for a further change of defence counsel filed by the Accused on 11 November 1996, pursuant to Article 19 of the Directive. On 9 January 1997, the Registrar assigned Nicolas Tiangaye and Patrice Monthé, who served as defence counsel for the Accused until the end of the trial. On 16 January 1997, the Chamber rejected a third motion for change of defence counsel filed by the Accused on 9 January 1997 . The decision of 16 January 1997 also put an end to the interim measures adopted by the Chamber on 13 January 1997, temporarily authorizing the Accused to cross-examine the witnesses himself, along with his two counsel.
14. On 27 May 1996, the then counsel for the Accused, Johan Scheers, filed a preliminary motion under Rule 73 of the Rules , requesting the Chamber to (i) rule that the criminal proceedings were inadmissible for reasons of flagrant violations of the rights of Defence; (ii) order the hearing of witnesses and that Defence investigations be conducted; (iii) exclude from the proceedings, all indirect witnesses to the acts for which the Accused is charged; and (iv) order the release of the Accused pending the trial on the merits. During the oral presentation of the motion at the hearing of 26 September 1996, however, the Defence raised issues beyond the framework of the said motion by advancing complaints regarding, on the one hand, the detention conditions of the Accused during his imprisonment in Zambia and, on the other hand, the delay by the Prosecutor in disclosing the Indictment and supporting material. In its decision of 27 September 1996 , the Chamber rejected the entire motion on the grounds that the objections raised by the Defence and the manner in which they were presented, did not provide sufficient basis for the Chamber to rule on the merits under Rule 73 of the Rules. That same day, the Chamber adjourned the trial at the request of the Defence and set 31 October 1996  as the official opening date of the trial on the merits.
15. On 29 October 1996, the Chamber granted the Prosecutor's motion of 23 October 1996 for the transfer of a witness detained in Rwanda in order for him to testify before the Tribunal. A similar motion by the Defence, filed on 30 October 1997, was granted by the Chamber, it being ordered that three witnesses then detained in Rwanda be transferred to the Tribunal's Detention Facilities for a period of not more than two months so as to testify in the trial . However, two subsequent requests by the Defence for the transfer and appearance in court of five and thirteen witnesses detained in Rwanda respectively were rejected, on the basis, inter alia, that the Defence was unable to demonstrate how the appearance of each witness was undoubtedly material in the discovery of the truth or that the conditions stipulated in Rule 90bis (b) of the Rules had been met .
16. Besides the above-mentioned motions, several pre-trial motions were filed by the Defence, including a motion for the defendant to sit at counsel table during trial, a motion for an expedited in camera hearing regarding Prosecutorial misconduct and a motion to compel the Prosecutor to conduct a fair and just investigation. These motions were not granted.
17. The trial of the Accused on the merits opened on 9 January 1997 before Trial Chamber I, composed of Judge Laity Kama, presiding, Judge Lennart Aspegren and Judge Navanethem Pillay. Pursuant to Rule 84 of the Rules, Honoré Rakotomanana and Yacob Haile-Mariam made the opening statement for the Prosecutor, which was followed by the opening statement for the Defence, made by Nicolas Tiangaye and Patrice Monthé. During the initial phase of the trial which took place over 26 trial days until 24 May 1997, 22 witnesses, including five expert witnesses, testified for the Prosecutor. Subsequent to the presentation of the Prosecutor's evidence, an in camera status conference was held after which the Chamber, at the request of the Defence, adjourned the trial until 29 September 1997.
18. All Prosecutor and Defence eye-witnesses requiring protection benefited from measures guaranteeing the confidentiality of their testimony . No information which could in any way identify the witnesses was given. During the hearings, letters of the alphabet were used as pseudonyms to refer to protected witnesses and screens isolated the said witnesses from the public, but not from the Accused and his counsel. One Defence witness was heard in camera.
19. On 13 January 1997, as an interim measure pending a Chamber decision on a request by the Accused for the replacement of his counsel, Akayesu was authorized by the Chamber to cross-examine, along with his assigned counsel, prosecution witnesses. The pertinent decision was rendered on 16 January 1997 , whereby the request for replacement of Counsel was dismissed and the interim measure terminated.
20. Most of the Rwandan witnesses spoke in Kinyarwanda and their testimonies were interpreted into the two working languages of the Tribunal (French and English). By Decision of 9 March 1998, the Chamber dismissed a Defence motion, based on Rule 91 of the Rules, to direct the Prosecutor to investigate an alleged false testimony by prosecution witness "R". The Chamber found that for the Defence to raise doubts as to the reliability of statements made by a witness, was not by itself sufficient to establish strong grounds for believing that the witness may have knowingly and wilfully given false testimony .
21. During the hearing of 23 January 1997, the Chamber requested the Prosecutor, in view of the exceptional nature of the offences, to submit all written witness statements already made available by her to the Defence. The Prosecutor objected to the request; hence the Chamber, by a decision rendered on 28 January 1997, pursuant to Rules 89(A), 89(C) and 98 of the Rules, ordered the Prosecutor to submit all available written witness statements to the Chamber in the case and that all such statements to which reference had been made by either the Prosecutor or the Defence shall be admitted as evidence and form part of the record. However, this was subject to the caveat that disclosure of all the written statements did not necessarily entail their admissibility as evidence .
22. On 4 February 1997, the Prosecutor, who had not yet complied with the order of 28 January 1997, filed a motion requesting the Chamber to reconsider and rescind the said order. The Prosecutor submitted, inter alia, that the order of 28 January 1997 represented an unjustified change in the established order for production of evidence and thus did not satisfy the provisions of Rule 85, that Rule 98 simply allows the Chamber to order the production of specific additional evidence and not the disclosure of all the evidence, that it involves the Chamber in the process of disclosure and, in actual fact, circumvents Rule 66 (A), and that the order is prejudicial to the parties. On 6 march 1997, the Chamber declared the Prosecutor's motion groundless, and expressed surprise, in the circumstances, at receiving a motion asking it to reconsider and rescind its order, instead of a motion for clarification. The Chamber specified in its decision that the order of 28 January 1997 could only be interpreted with respect to the witness statements already communicated to the Defence . On 16 April 1997, the Prosecutor filed a notice of intent to comply with the Chamber's order to submit witness statements.
23. As stated above, 24 May 1997 marked the end of the first part of the trial of the Accused with the testimony of the last prosecution witness. However, on 16 June 1997, the Prosecutor submitted a request to bring an expedited oral motion before the Chamber seeking an amendment of the Indictment. During the hearing held to that end on 17 June 1997, the Prosecutor sought leave to add three further Counts, namely, Count 13: rape, a Crime Against Humanity, punishable under Article 3 (g) of the Statute, Count 14: inhumane acts, a Crime Against Humanity, punishable under Article 3 (i) of the Statute, and Count 15: outrages on personal dignity, notably rape, degrading and humiliating treatment and indecent assault, a Violation of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Article 4(2)(e) of Additional Protocol II, as incorporated in Article 4(e) of the Statute. The Chamber granted leave to the Prosecutor to amend the Indictment and postponed the date for resumption of the trial to 23 October 1997 .
24. The second phase of the trial started on 23 October 1997 with the initial appearance of Akayesu for the new counts in a public session before the Chamber. The Accused pleaded not guilty to each of the new counts. The Prosecutor then proceeded to present six new witnesses, including an investigator with the Office of the Prosecutor. In all, the Prosecutor put 28 witnesses on the stand over 31 trial days. The Defence, for its part, presented its evidence over the course of 12 trial days between 4 November 1997 and 13 March 1998. It called 13 witnesses, including the Accused, to the stand. A total of 155 exhibits were submitted during the trial.
25. During the second phase of the trial, the Defence requested and obtained the issuance of a subpoena for Major-General Roméo Dallaire, former force Commander of UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda), whose immunity had been partially lifted by the UN Secretary-General, to appear as a witness for the Defence . The Chamber also granted leave to a representative of the United Nations Secretariat to appear as an Amicus Curiae to make a statement on the lifting of the immunity Major-General Roméo Dallaire enjoys by virtue of his position as former force Commander of UNAMIR .
26. However, the Chamber did not grant the Defence motion for the issuance of a subpoena for two persons accused before the Tribunal to appear as Defence witnesses, on the grounds that their fundamental rights, as recognized by Article 20(4)(g) of the Statute, would perhaps be violated, and that there would be a risk that their appearance as witnesses in the case could cause prejudice to them . A further Defence motion for the appearance of another accused as an expert witness was similarly dismissed . The Chamber held therein that the impartiality of the potential expert witness, who is accused by the Tribunal for crimes related to those with which Akayesu is charged, could not be assured and consequently that he did not fulfil the requisite conditions for appearing as an expert witness. Furthermore, the Chamber found that for this particular Accused to be compelled to appear as an expert witness in the case would be prejudicial to him and could possibly violate his fundamental rights, as recognized by the provisions of Article 20(4)(g) of the Statute and Article 14(3)(g) of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights of 1966.
27. The Chamber dismissed a Defence motion for a site visit and the conduct of a forensic analysis of the remains of three alleged victims. The Chamber found that a new forensic analysis would not be appropriate nor, in any case, instrumental in the discovery of the truth, on the basis, inter alia, that a number of the purported mass graves, including, without a doubt, those supposedly in the vicinity of the Taba bureau communal' had been subject of previous exhumations. Moreover, the Chamber felt that the arguments of the Defence Counsel in support of the motion were pertinent mainly to evaluating the credibility of certain witness statements and not to showing the necessity for an exhumation and forensic analysis, as requested. 
28. None of the parties presented witnesses for rebuttal purposes. The Accused testified in his own defence on 12 March 1998 and was cross-examined the next day by the Prosecutor. The latter presented her final arguments on 19 and 23 March, and the Defence presented its closing arguments on 26 March 1998. The trial on the merits was held over a period of 60 days of hearings, since 9 January 1997. The case was adjourned on 26 March 1998 for deliberation on the Judgment by the Chamber.
1.4.2. The Accused's line of defence
29. The Accused has pleaded not guilty to all counts of the Indictment, both at his initial appearance, held on 30 May 1996, and at the hearing of 23 October 1997 when he pleaded not guilty to each of the new counts which had been added to the Indictment when it was amended on 17 June 1997.
30. In essence, the Defence case - insofar as the Chamber has been able to establish it - is that the Accused did not commit, order or participate in any of the killings, beatings or acts of sexual violence alleged in the Indictment. The Defence concedes that a genocide occurred in Rwanda and that massacres of Tutsi took place in Taba Commune, but it argues that the Accused was helpless to prevent them, being outnumbered and overpowered by one Silas Kubwimana and the Interahamwe. The Defence pointed out that, according to prosecution witness R, Akayesu had been so harassed by the Interahamwe that at one point he had had to flee Taba commune. Once the massacres had become widespread, the Accused was denuded of all authority and lacked the means to stop the killings.
31. The Defence claims that the Chamber should not require the Accused to be a hero, to have laid down his life - as, for example, did the bourgmestre of Mugina - in a futile attempt to prevent killings and beatings. The Defence alluded to the fact that General Dallaire, in charge of UNAMIR and 2,500 troops, was unable to prevent the genocide. How, then, was Akayesu, with 10 communal policemen at his disposal, to fare any better? Moreover, the Defence argue, no bourgmestre in the whole of Rwanda was able to prevent the massacres in his Commune, no matter how willing he was to do so.
32. As for acts of sexual violence, the Defence case is somewhat different from that for killings and beatings, in that, whereas for the latter the Defence does not contest that there were killings and beatings, it does deny that there were acts of sexual violence committed, at least at the Bureau Communal. During his testimony the Accused emphatically denied that any rapes had taken place at the Bureau Communal, even when he was not there. The Chamber notes the Accused's emphatic denial of facts which are not entirely within his knowledge.
33. As general remarks, the Defence alluded to the fragility of human testimony as opposed to documentary evidence, and specifically referred to the evidence of Dr. Mathias Ruzindana, who had testified about problems in relying on eye-witness accounts of Rwandans. The Defence also raised problems associated with alleged "syndicates of informers", in which groups of Rwandans supposedly collaborated to concoct testimony against a person for revenge or other motives. This allegation is specifically dealt with below.
34. As regards the Accused, the Defence pointed out that, though the Prosecutor admitted that the Accused had opposed massacres before 18 April 1994, the Prosecutor could not demonstrate that he was a "genocidal ideologue", since one did not adopt the ideology of genocide overnight. Hence, the Defence argued, he could not be convicted of genocide.
35. In general, the Defence argued that the Accused was a "scapegoat", who found himself Accused before the Chamber only because he was a Hutu and a bourgmestre at the time of the massacres.
36. Turning to the specific allegations contained in the Indictment, the Defence case is that there was no change in Akayesu's attitude or behaviour before and after the Murambi meeting of 18 April 1998. Both before and after, he attempted to save Tutsi lives. Witness DBB testified that the Accused gave a Tutsi woman (witness DEEX) a laissez-passer, although he could not say whether the accused knew at the time that the woman was a Tutsi or not. Witness DEEX confirmed that she was given a laissez-passer by the accused. Witnesses DIX and DJX also heard that Akayesu had saved Tutsi lives.
37. The Defence also challenged the premise that the Murambi meeting of 18 April 1994 was the key event which led to a complete change in the accused's behaviour. Since, the Defence argued, it had not been shown that orders for the extermination of the Tutsi were given at the Murambi meeting by the interim government, it follows that the accused could not have returned to his Commune a changed man because of those non-existent orders. The Defence pointed out that only one prosecution witness and one Defence witness had attended the Murambi meeting, and that neither testified that an explicit message to kill the Tutsi had been given.
38. Regarding the Gishyeshye meeting of 19 April 1994, the Defence argued that the accused was forced by the Interahamwe to read a document which allegedly mentioned the names of RPF accomplices, but that the accused tried to dissuade the population from being incited by the document, arguing that the mere appearance of names on a list did not mean that the persons named were accomplices of the RPF. The Defence also noted further "contradictions" in the accounts given by witnesses of the Gishyeshye meeting.
39. As regards the killings of the eight Runda refugees and the five teachers, the Defence pointed out that the only witness to these killings was witness K, and that the accused had, at the time of his interview by the OTP in Zambia, cited witness K as a possible Defence witness. It begged credulity that the accused would contemplate calling as a Defence witness a person whom he knew had seen him order such killings.
40. Concerning the killings of the Karangwa brothers, the Defence argued that there was such uncertainty as to how they were killed, and by what instruments, that a conviction could not stand in the absence of these material averments. It was because of these inconsistencies and uncertainties that the Defence had asked for an exhumation of the bodies, which had not been granted.
41. The charges of beatings the Defence contested on the grounds that no medical examination had been conducted on the alleged victims to verify that the injuries which they claimed were sustained as a result of the accused's actions could genuinely be so attributed.
42. The charges of offences of sexual violence, the Defence argued, were added under the pressure of public opinion and were not credibly supported by the evidence. Witness J's account, for example, of living in a tree for one week after her family were killed and her sister raped, while several months pregnant, was simply not credible but rather the product of fantasy the Defence claimed - "of interest to psychiatrists, but not justice".
43. The Chamber has considered the Defence case extremely carefully and it will be treated here in the course of making the various factual and legal findings. There is one aspect which, however, should be dealt with here.
Putting the case to a witness
44. In the Defence closing argument, Mr. Nicholas Tiangaye, made the suggestion that some, if not all, of the Prosecution witnesses who had testified against Jean-Paul Akayesu did so because they were colluding in a "syndicate of informers" which would denounce a particular individual for political reasons or in order to take over his property. In this connection, Mr. Tiangaye quoted Rene Degni-Segui, the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on Rwanda, who recounted a story of a demonstrably innocent Rwandan who had been denounced by 15 witnesses as a participant in the genocide. Mr. Tiangaye concluded thus:
"... there were cases of calumny which existed and which enabled people to denounce others regarding their participation in genocide in order to be able to take over their property."
Mr. Tiangaye then went on to say:
"So, what do we do, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, when witnesses come to tell lies before the Chamber, what do we do?" 
45. To the extent that Defence counsel invites the Chamber to disbelieve the testimony of Prosecution witnesses because they may belong to a syndicate of informers or that they may be denouncing Akayesu in order to take over his property, and that they have therefore lied before the Chamber, it is to be noted this is a very serious allegation of false testimony or perjury, which is a criminal offence. Indeed, Defence counsel during the course of the trial made a motion for a certain prosecution witness to be investigated for false testimony; which motion was rejected in a Decision of this Trial Chamber in which it gave its reasons . That matter does not concern the Chamber here. What is of concern is whether the Chamber should give any weight, in its deliberations, to the possibility raised by Defence counsel that prosecution witnesses may have been lying for one of the above-mentioned motives.
46. The Chamber holds that, as a blanket allegation to undermine the credibility of prosecution witnesses, this allegation can carry no weight, for two reasons. First, an attack on credibility which is not particularised with respect to individual witnesses is no attack at all on those witnesses' credibility; it is merely a generalised and unsubstantiated suspicion. Doubt can only arise where the criteria for doubt are fulfilled. To state that all prosecution witnesses should be disbelieved because some Rwandan witnesses elsewhere have lied is similar to saying, "some money is counterfeit, therefore all money might be counterfeit". If, and this is the second point, the Defence wish to challenge prosecution witnesses as members of an informer's syndicate, or to allege that they are lying in order to be able to confiscate the accused's property, then the Defence must lay the foundations for that challenge and put the challenge to the witness in question during cross-examination. This is both a matter of practicality and of principle. The practical matter is this: if the Defence does put to a witness the allegation that he is lying because he wishes to take the accused's property, then this may elicit a convincing admission or rebuttal. The witness may break down and reveal, by his words or demeanour, that he has indeed been lying for that purpose; alternatively, he may offer a convincing rebuttal, for example, by pointing out that the accused has no property which the witness could wish to misappropriate. Either way, the matter might be resolved. To never put the crucial question to the witness is to deprive the Chamber of such a possible resolution. As a matter of principle, it is only fair to a witness, whom the Defence wishes to accuse of lying, to give him or her an opportunity to hear that allegation and to respond to it. This is a rule in Common law,  but it is also simply a matter of justice and fairness to victims and witnesses, principles recognised in all legal systems throughout the world.
47. It is to be noted that during the trial the Defence did not put, nor even suggest, to a single prosecution witness that he or she was lying because he or she had been drawn into a syndicate of informers and instructed as to how to testify against the accused, or that the witness was lying because he or she wished to take the accused's property. In these circumstances, Defence counsel's attempt in his closing arguments to tar all prosecution witnesses with the same broad brush of suspicion cannot be accepted by the Chamber. Thus the credibility of each witness must be assessed on its merits, taking into account the witness's demeanour and the consistency and credibility or otherwise of the answers given by him or her under oath.
Footnote 8. On 1 October 1996, Louise Arbour succeeded Richard Goldstone as Prosecutor of the Tribunal.
Footnote 9. On 26 April 1997, Bernard Acho Muna succeeded Honoré Rakotomanana as Deputy Prosecutor of the Tribunal.
Footnote 10. Besides the people already mentioned, the Prosecutor was represented during the trial by Patricia Viseur Sellers, James K. Stewart, Luc C"té, Sara Dareshori and Rosette Muzigo-Morrison.
Footnote 11. Decision: Order for Continued Detention Awaiting Trial, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I, 30 May 1996.
Footnote 12. ICTR/2/L.2
Footnote 13. Decision Concerning a Replacement of an Assigned Counsel and Postponement of the Trial, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 31 October 1996
Footnote 14. Decision on the Request of the Accused for Replacement of Assigned Counsel, The Prosecutor Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I, 16 January 1997.
Footnote 15. As adopted on 5 July 1995
Footnote 16. Decision on the Preliminary Motion Submitted by the Defence on the Form of the Indictment and Exclusion of Evidence. The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I, 27 September 1996.
Footnote 17. Decision on Postponement of the Trial, The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I, 27 September 1996. However, at the hearing of 31 October, the beginning of the trial was postponed to 9 January 1997 at the request of the Defence.
Footnote 18. Order for Temporary Transfer of Three Detained Witnesses Pursuant to Rule 90bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case NO. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I, 31 October 1997
Footnote 19. Decison on a Motion for the Appearance and Protection of Witnesses Called by the Defence, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case NO. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I, 9 February 1998, & Decision on the Motion for the Transfer and Protection of Defence Witnesses, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case NO. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I, 26 February 1998
Footnote 20. Decision on the preliminary motion submitted by the Prosecutor for protective measures for witnesses, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 27 September 1996.
Footnote 21. Ibid 14
Footnote 22. Oral decision. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I, 9 March 1998, written decision issued on 24 March 1998.
Footnote 23. Decision by the Tribunal on its Request to the Prosecutor to Submit the Written Witness Statements, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I, 28 January 1997.
Footnote 24. Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion to Reconsider and Rescind the Order of 18 January 1997, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I, 6 March 1997
Footnote 25. Leave to amend the Indictment, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I, 17 June 1997.
Footnote 26. Decision on the Motion to Subpoena a Witness. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-94-T, Trial Chamber I, 19 November 1997.
Footnote 27. Order Granting Leave for Amicus Curiae to Appear, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Trial Chamber I, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 12 February 1998.
Footnote 28. Oral decision on a Motion for Summonses and Protection of Witnesses Called by the Defence, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I, 17 February 1998, written decision 23 February 1998.
Footnote 29. Decision on a Defence Motion for the Appearance of an Accused as an Expert Witness, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I, 9 March 1998.
Footnote 30. Oral decision on the Defence Motion Requesting an Inspection of the Site and the Conduct of a Forensic Analysis, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I, 17 February 1998, written decision 3 March 1998.
Footnote 31. See Evidentiary Matters'.
Footnote 32. Hearing of 26 March 1998, p.61 (French version)
Footnote 33. Transcript of hearing of 26 March 1998, p.17.
Footnote 34. See Procedural Background' as relates to Decision on False Testimony.
Footnote 35. See Adrian Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence, (Butterworths: 1989), p. 120: "A cross-examiner who wishes to suggest to the jury that the witness is not speaking the truth on a particular matter must lay a proper foundation by putting that matter to the witness so that he has an opportunity of giving any explanation which is open to him", noting, however, that this is not a "hard and fast" rule.
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