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Tribunal: ICTY
Accused:LIMAJ, Fatmir; BALA, Haradin; MUSLIU, Isak
Type of Decision:Judgement
Case Number:IT-03-66-T
Date of Decision:30-11-2005
Heading:Judgement: Context
Keywords:History Of Former Yugoslavia
Reference to case-law:
Paragraphs:36 - 82


A. Political context in Kosovo and emergence of the KLA

36. The crimes alleged in the Indictment took place in the territory of Kosovo, currently a United Nations-administered province within the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, bordering on the north and east the Republic of Serbia, on the south Macedonia and Albania, and on the west Albania and Montenegro.

37. Under the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (" SFRY " ) of 1974, Kosovo was an autonomous province within the Republic of Serbia and one of the constituent entities of the SFRY, thus enjoying a certain degree of self -management and autonomy. [71] Kosovo's status as an autonomous province within the Republic of Serbia was also recognized by the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia of 1974 which further proclaimed the province's autonomy to regulate certain administrative and linguistic matters. [72]

38. In November 1988 the Assembly of Serbia proposed amendments to the Constitution of Serbia that would limit Kosovo's autonomous powers. [73] The proposed amendments triggered a strong public reaction in Kosovo and marches against the proposals, attended by a large number of people, were held. [74] The protests intensified in February 1989 when many people in Kosovo went on strike or declared hunger strikes. [75] On 3 March 1989 the SFRY Presidency declared a state of emergency. Some days later the Assembly of Kosovo met in Prishtina/Pristina and, among protests and increased military presence, passed the proposed constitutional amendments. [76] On 28 March 1989 the Assembly of Serbia amended the Constitution of Serbia and thus effectively revoked Kosovo's autonomous status. [77]

39. In 1990 the Assembly of Kosovo and the provincial government were abolished. [78] In March 1990 the Assembly of Serbia adopted a series of measures which led to the dismissal of Kosovo Albanians from political and economic institutions and from large business establishments. [79] Education in Albanian language, especially secondary and higher education, was curtailed. [80] Kosovo Albanian students and professors were denied access to universities and thus had to organise a parallel system of education with classes being held in private homes. [81] The number of human rights violations against Kosovo Albanians increased, [82] Kosovo Albanians were arrested and mistreated by the Serbian police. [83]

40. On 2 July 1990 the Kosovo Albanian delegates of the Assembly of Kosovo gathered outside the parliament building and declared that the revocation of Kosovo's autonomy was unlawful and that the province would participate in the Federation only if it was granted the same status as the other republics. [84] The statement was declared illegal by the Serbian authorities [85] but it provoked a feeling of euphoria among Kosovo Albanians. [86]

41. In this period several political parties and movements emerged. The Democratic League of Kosovo (" LDK" ), a political party advocating for a peaceful solution of the Kosovo question through dialogue, was formed in 1989. [87] Its chairman was Ibrahim Rugova. At about the same time, in 1990, the Popular Movement for Kosovo (" LPK" ), a successor of the Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosovo (" LPRK" ), was established. [88] The LPK advocated for a solution of the Kosovo question through active means and did not exclude the possibility of armed action. [89] The LPK was active primarily among Kosovo Albanian communities in countries in Western Europe as its activities in Kosovo were conducted underground. [90] After the public appearance of the Kosovo Liberation Army (" KLA" ) in 1997, [91] the LPK's activities focused on supporting the KLA politically and financially. [92]

42. In September 1991 a referendum for independence was held in Kosovo, in which the Serbian population of the province did not participate. The overwhelming majority of the Kosovo Albanians voted for independence. [93] In May 1992 elections were held in Kosovo and the LDK led by Ibrahim Rugova won the majority of votes. [94] However, the Parliament never convened. [95]

43. In the meantime, discrete military formations were formed clandestinely. In 1991, Adem Jashari and an armed political formation in Prekazi/Prekaz, Skenderaj /Srbica municipality, organised the first armed action against the Serbian police and military forces. [96]

44. Following unsuccessful attempts to launch the work of the new Kosovo Parliament, the political opposition to the LDK and its policy for a peaceful solution of the Kosovo question grew stronger. [97] In the period 1991-1993 the emerging military formations and these political groups began to establish closer connections. [98] In March or April 1993 a meeting was held in Preqazi/Prekaze attended by Adem Jashari, representing the military formations, as well as by Jakup Krasniqi and other representatives of the political formations. [99] At the meeting the future roles of the political and the military formations were determined and the KLA was formed. [100] While the formation of the KLA was announced in 1994, [101] it did not become widely known in Kosovo until 1997. [102]

45. The KLA supported a solution of the Kosovo question through an active armed resistance to the official regime. [103] It was prohibited by the official authorities and operated underground. [104] Its activities aimed at preparing the citizens of Kosovo for a liberation war, at mobilizing the population throughout the entire territory, and at responding by armed action to the acts of violence of the Serbian authorities. [105] It was viewed by the Serbian authorities and some observers as a terrorist organisation, [106] while for its supporters the KLA was a guerrilla liberation movement targeting the Serbian police and army in Kosovo. [107]

46. The main governing body of the KLA was the General Staff. Among other activities, the General Staff issued statements on behalf of the KLA informing the public of its activities, [108] authorised military action, [109] and assigned tasks to individuals in the organisation. [110] The General Staff operated underground. [111] In the early years of the KLA's existence only a small number of its members were based in Kosovo, the majority operating from countries in Western Europe, from the United States, or from Albania. [112] In 1996, however, the General Staff expanded its operations in Kosovo. [113] The commander of the KLA from its inception until March 1998 was Adem Jashari. [114] After Adem Jashari's death on or about 5 March 1998 the KLA commander became Azem Syla. [115] In May 1998 the KLA's General Staff included also the following members: Sokol Bashota, Rexhep Selimi, Llahib Rrahimi, Xhavid Zeka, Hashim Thaci, Kadri Veseli, and Jakup Krasniqi. [116] Due to the difficult security situation and the fact that they had to operate underground the General Staff did not meet regularly. [117]

47. Between 1994 and 1997 the situation in Kosovo continued to deteriorate. Kosovo Albanians continued to be fired from political, economic and educational institutions. [118] Student demonstrations were held. [119] Individuals involved in political life were taken to police stations for questioning or " informative talks " . [120] Kosovo Albanians were being arrested in large numbers. It is said they were often mistreated by the police. [121] Many were charged with illegal possession of arms. Thousands of people left Kosovo. [122] The exclusion of the Kosovo question from the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995 further galvanised the more radical political movements. [123]

48. At the end of 1997 and the beginning of 1998 the tension in Kosovo exacerbated. In November 1997 during an armed clash between Serbian forces and the KLA in the village of Llaushe/Lausa, Halil Geci, a teacher, was killed. [124] At his funeral, which was attended by thousands of people and was broadcast on Kosovo television, three KLA members wearing masks appeared in public for the first time. [125] Their appearance made the KLA's existence known to the wider public in Kosovo. [126]

49. On 28 February and 1 March 1998 Serbian police forces launched an attack on the villages of Qirez/Cirez and Likoshan/Likosane, located two km apart, in the Drenica area. [127] Helicopters, armoured military vehicles, mortars and machine guns were used in the attack. [128] In both cases the Serbian special police forces attacked without a warning and fired indiscriminately at civilians. [129] On or about 5 March 1998 Serbian security forces attacked the family compound of the leader of the KLA, Adem Jashari, in Prekazi-i-Poshtem/Donje Prekaze, a village located not far from Likoshan/Likosane and Qirez/Cirez, also in the area of Drenica. [130] The fighting, in which armoured vehicles were used, continued for about 36 hours. [131] The evidence is that during the February-March 1998 attacks in the area of Drenica 83 Kosovo Albanians were killed. [132] Among the dead victims were elderly people [133] as well as at least 24 women and children. [134] During the attack on Qirez/Cirez a pregnant woman was shot in the face [135] and a baby was killed in Prekazi-i-Poshtem/Donje Prekaze. [136] Many of the victims were shot at a very close range. [137] Reports indicated that men were summarily executed in front of their homes and that some of the victims were shot dead while in police custody. [138] During the attack on Prekazi-i-Poshtem/Donje Prekaze the entire Jashari family, except for an 11 year old girl, was killed. [139]

50. The attacks on the three villages in the area of Drenica marked a turning point in the Kosovo crisis. The popular support for the KLA greatly increased. The funeral of the victims was attended by tens of thousands of people. [140] Jakup Krasniqi, at the time a member of the KLA's General Staff, delivered a speech. [141] Many people in Kosovo were joining the KLA and its support among Kosovo Albanian communities abroad was growing. [142]

51. In March 1998 a group of about 15 Kosovo Albanians living in Switzerland including Ismet Jashari, the Accused Fatmir Limaj, Hashim Thaci, Agim Bajram and Shukri Buja left for Kosovo. [143] They flew to Tirana in Albania and on the following day crossed the Kosovo-Albanian border on foot carrying bags loaded with ammunition. [144] They went to the Drenica zone where fighting in the Prekazi/Prekaze area was continuing, and which, in their understanding, was the only place where they could join the KLA. [145] Many other Kosovo Albanians living abroad were also returning to Kosovo at the time. [146]

52. The events that occurred in the area of Drenica in February and March 1998 marked a new stage in the development of the conflict in Kosovo. After the attacks in Drenica the Serbian forces began using typical military style equipment and tactics. [147] The fighting between Serbian forces and the KLA intensified and covered wider geographic areas. [148]

B. Development of the KLA units in various regions of Kosovo
53. After their arrival in Kosovo in March 1998, members of the KLA, including Shukri Buja, Fatmir Limaj, Hashim Thaci, Fehmi Lladrovci and Agim Bajrami, met in Tice/Tica and discussed the organisation of the KLA. Shukri Buja asked to be sent to the Lipjan/Lipljan and Shtime/Stimlje municipalities, which he knew best. [149] Agim Bajrami settled in Kacanik/Kacanik and Fatmir Limaj in Malisheve/Malisevo. [150] Shukri Buja decided to start organising a guerrilla movement from Mollopolc/Malopoljce in the Shtime/Stimlje municipality. He stayed there throughout March and April 1998. [151] After his return to Kosovo, Ramiz Qeriqi undertook the organisation of a unit in Kroimire/Krajmirovce. [152] Ismet Jashari, aka Kumanova, was asked to organise a KLA unit in Suhareke/Suva Reka. [153] In the evidence of Shukri Buja, Ismet Jashari was later based in Luzhnice/Luznica and Klecke/Klecka. [154] Agim Bajrami was organising a unit in the municipality of Kacanik/Kacanik. [155] In April 1998 Shukri Buja went to Ferizaj/Urosevac to help Imri Llazi to organise a guerrilla unit in the Ferizaj/Urosevac municipality. [156] In May 1998 the process of setting up the Shtime/Stimlje guerrilla unit was completed. [157]

54. In May 1998 Ramiz Qeriqi was organising people in the area of Kroimire/Krajmirovce. He had soldiers at fighting points in Carraleve/Crnoljevo, Zborc/Zborce, Fushtice /Fustica and Blinaje/Lipovica. There were barracks in Pjetershtice/Petrastica. [158] Ramadan Behluli was in charge of six soldiers in Pjetershtice/Petrastica. [159] KLA members were digging trenches on the main road from Carraleve/Crnoljevo to Pjetershtice /Petrastica and building bunkers. [160] They were admitting new soldiers. By the beginning of June 1998 there were about 70 to 100 KLA members in the area of Kroimire/Krajmirovce. [161] In the end of May 1998 the unit in Kroimire/Krajmirovce was named " Sokoli" or " Petriti " . [162] Shukri Buja testified that in June 1998, after the creation of that unit, a number of people wanted to join the KLA, which led to the setting up of another unit in Pjetershtice/Petrastica, covering also the area of Zborc/Zborce. [163] The number of soldiers under Ramadan Behluli's command increased to 17 by 17 June 1998. [164] At the end of May 1998, Shukri Buja took over the command of the area of Kroimire/Krajmirovce. [165] Ramiz Qeriqi became his deputy. [166] In June 1998, KLA units were established also in Fushtice/Fustica and Blinaje/Lipovica. [167] Further, as described later in this decision, a number of units were formed in the area of Llapushnik/Lapusnik. [168]

55. Sylejman Selimi testified that, at the end of May 1998, he was appointed commander of the 1st operational zone, the Drenica zone. [169] He was based in Likofc/Likovac. [170] From May 1998 onwards, the number of soldiers under Sylejman Selimi's command increased from around 200-300 to over a thousand by the end of 1998. [171] Rexhep Selimi stated that the Drenica operational zone was more advanced than other zones. The manner in which it was structured became a model for structuring other zones. [172]

56. The forming of the KLA structure appears to have been a slow process which was affected by factors independent of the local leaders. There were difficulties moving from one area to another because of the rugged terrain. [173] The KLA had insufficient weapons. Not every soldier had a weapon. [174] Shukri Buja was tasked to organise a supply line of weapons from Albania to Kosovo, to the municipalities of Kacanik/Kacanik, Lipjan/Lipljan, Shtime/Stimlje and Ferizaj /Urosevac. [175] The development of the KLA structure was also influenced by armed confrontations with the Serbian forces. [176] A battle took place on 9 May 1998 in the area of Llapushnik/Lapusnik. [177] On 29 May 1998 the KLA again fought against Serbian forces in Llapushnik/Lapusnik. [178] On 14, 17 and 23 June 1998 there were clashes between the belligerent forces in Carraleve/Crnoljevo. [179]

57. Bislim Zyrapi testified that in mid June preparations for the structuring of the Pashtrik/Pastrik zone began. [180] Shukri Buja and Jakup Krasniqi stated that the zone was created in July 1998. [181] In his evidence the Accused Fatmir Limaj acknowledged that the Pashtrik/Pastrik zone existed in early July 1998. [182] However, a KLA communiquÚ in May 1998 had mentioned the Pashtrik/Pastrik " operational subzone" . [183] Rexhep Selimi sought to explain this by distinguishing the term " operational subzone" from " zone" . He explained that the term " operational subzone" was then used by the KLA in relation to a guerrilla body composed of small groups operating in various zones. [184] If this explanation is reliable, the mention in the communiquÚ may be unrelated to a later and more developed Pashtrik/Pastrik " zone" described by other witnesses. Rexhep Selimi placed the structuring of the Pashtrik/Pastrik zone as beginning in August 1998. [185] This is not consistent with the other evidence relating to this issue. In his testimony Rexhep Selimi appears to link the structuring of zones with the creation of brigades. [186] However, other evidence indicates that these two processes were distinct, brigades having been created later than operational zones. [187] For this reason, the Chamber does not accept the evidence of Rexhep Selimi that the structuring of this zone did not commence until August 1998.

58. Fatmir Limaj and Shukri Buja stated that Muse Jashari was appointed initial commander of the Pashtrik/Pastrik zone. [188] It was also the testimony of Jakup Krasniqi and Rexhep Selimi that Muse Jashari was the commander of that zone, before being replaced by Ekrem Rexha and, later, Tahir Sinani. [189] Jakup Krasniqi specified that Muse Jashari commanded the Pashtrik/Pastrik zone between July and November 1998. [190] During a pre-trial interview, Ramadan Behluli had made it clear that Fatmir Limaj was the commander of the Pashtrik/Pastrik zone. [191] However, when questioned about this in his evidence, Behluli specifically denied knowing that this was so in June and July 1998. [192] L95 stated that when he met Fatmir Limaj in Novoselle/Novo Selo, he knew that Limaj was the commander of a zone, the territory of which, as described by the witness, corresponds roughly with at least parts of the Pashtrik/Pastrik zone. [193] The meeting took place, according to the evidence of both L95 and Fatmir Limaj, at the end of July 1998. [194] For reasons detailed later, [195] it is apparent that L95's knowledge in this respect was quite limited. His evidence does not, therefore, displace the consistent evidence that Muse Jashari was the commander of the Pashtrik/Pastrik zone.

59. Shukri Buja testified that in early July 1998 there were three subzones: Pashtrik /Pastrik, Nerodime/Nerodimlje and Drenica. [196] After a meeting with Jakup Krasniqi on 20 June 1998, Shukri Buja began organising the operational subzone of Nerodime/Nerodimlje. [197] On 6 July 1998 he became the commander of that subzone, which covered the municipalities of Shtime/Stimlje, Lipjan/Lipljan, Ferizaj/Urosevac and Kacanik/Kacanik. [198] Shukri Buja stated that in July 1998 the subzones of Pashtrik/Pastrik and Nerodime /Nerodimlje were on both sides of the Berishe/Berisa Mountains. [199] The municipality of Lipjan/Lipljan was divided between those two zones. [200]

60. In the testimony of Shukri Buja and Sylejman Selimi, a part of the division line between the subzones of Drenica and Pashtrik/Pastrik went along the Peje/Pec - Prishtine/Pristina highway. [201] Ramadan Behluli drew on a map the boundaries of his zone, which, as he explained, reflected the situation after August 1998. The boundary drawn by Ramadan Behluli in the area of Llapushnik/Lapusnik goes along the Peje/Pec - Prishtine/Pristina highway. [202] L95, testified, although not without hesitation, that the northern border of the zone, the headquarters of which was located in Klecke/Klecka, ran along the road to Prishtine/Pristina between Arlat/Orlate and Komoran/Komorane. [203] Bislim Zyrapi testified that Llapushnik/Lapusnik was at some point in the Pashtrik /Pastrik zone. However, he made it clear that his knowledge about the organisation of units in that area was limited. [204] The compound in Llapushnik/Lapusnik at which, according to the Indictment, the prison camp operated, was located south of that highway. [205] The evidence of these witnesses would thus indicate that the camp was in the Pashtrik /Pastrik zone. There is, however, evidence pointing towards a different zone. Jakup Krasniqi specifically refuted the contention that Llapushnik/Lapusnik was in the Pashtrik/Pastrik zone. He stated that the entire municipality of Gllogoc /Glogovac, including Llapushnik/Lapusnik, was in the Drenica operational zone. [206] Fatmir Limaj confirmed and pointed out that the borders of zones corresponded with the borders of municipalities. [207] Shukri Buja also testified that that the zones were organised according to municipalities and each municipality had units. [208] It is to be noted, however, that Shukri Buja himself gave an example of a border between two zones which did not go along the boundaries of a municipality, but divided the municipality of Lipjan/Lipljan. [209] Further, zones clearly do not correspond with municipalities on a map created in 1998 by the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom, the general accuracy of which was accepted by Sylejman Selimi. [210]

61. There is an abundance of evidence to the effect that a boundary between areas of responsibility of various units went along the Peje/Pec - Prishtine/Pristina highway. [211] This is not, however, indicative of there being a zone border going along the highway, as the units on both sides of the road might have been in the same zone. It is not unlikely that at some point in time the border between the Pashtrik/Pastrik zone and the Drenica zone did go along that highway. Nonetheless, the evidence is too scarce and contradictory for a definite finding to be made. In addition, as demonstrated, the structure of the KLA was at the time in the process of formation, which makes it particularly difficult to precisely delineate the territorial division of responsibility at various stages of the development of the structure. In support of their contention that the border went along the highway, the Prosecution makes reference to an oath ceremony in Llapushnik/Lapusnik, attended by Muse Jashari, the first commander of the Pashtrik/Pastrik zone. [212] However, there is nothing to suggest that only commanders from the same zone would have attended to such a ceremony.

62. An offensive by Serbian military and police forces against KLA units to regain control of territory " occupied" by the KLA was initiated during the summer of 1998. On 19 July 1998 the KLA fought against the Serbian forces at Rahovec/Orahovac. [213] Subsequently, the town of Rahovec /Orahovac became the first town that the KLA took under its control, although for a brief period as it was quickly retaken. [214] Another battle between the KLA and Serbian forces took place on 25 and 26 July 1998, once again in the area of Llapushnik/Lapusnik. [215] At the same time, on 25 July 1998 KLA soldiers under the command of Ramiz Qeriqi defended Carraleve/Crnoljevo from another Serbian offensive. Eventually the Serbians stopped at Zborc/Zborce. [216] The advancement of the Serbian offensive in the summer of 1998 made a large number of people flee from their places of residence. The displacement began in the middle of July 1998, especially in Rahovec/Orahovac. In the villages of Kizhareke/Kisna Reka, Nekoc/Nekovce, Bajice/Banjica, Shale/Sedlare and Kroimire/Krajmirovice there were about sixty or seventy thousand of displaced people. [217] Human Rights Watch estimated that at least 300,000 people were displaced in that period in Kosovo. [218]

63. By the end of August 1998 there were seven KLA zones. [219] The Pashtrik/Pastrik zone comprised the municipalities of Malisheve/Malisevo, Rahovec /Orahovac, Prizren/Prizren, Sharri, the former Dragash/Gora, and Suhareke/Suva Reka. [220] The Dukagjin zone comprised the municipalities of Istog/Istok, Peje/Pec, Dešane/Decani and Gjurakovc/Durakovac, as well as part of the Kline/Klina municipality. It was commanded by Ramush Haradinaj. [221] The other zones were the Nerodime /Nerodimlje, Shala, Llap and Karadak zones. [222]

64. After the offensive of 25 and 26 July 1998, brigades and battalions were formed. [223] As a zone commander, [224] Sylejman Selimi was charged with establishing the brigades in Drenica from the pre -existing points and units. He established the 111th Brigade operating in Likofc /Likovac, as well as the 112th, 113th and 114th Brigades. [225] The 121st Brigade was formed sometime in August 1998. [226] Fatmir Limaj stated that a proposal to that effect was made already on 6 August 1998. Its implementation was, however, suspended for twenty days because of an offensive launched by the Serbian forces. [227] Similarly, Ramadan Behluli testified that the 121st Brigade was created after the death of Kumanova at the end of August 1998. [228] Rexhep Selimi stated that it took place at the end of August or in September. [229] There is, however, a KLA letter of appointment of Ramiz Qeriqi " pursuant to the decision of the command of 121st Brigade" which is dated 16 August 1998. [230] This demonstrates, in the finding of the Chamber, that the brigade existed already by 16 August 1998. In any event, as the exact date of the creation of the 121st Brigade is of little relevance to the charges against the Accused, it suffices to conclude that this occurred in the second half of August 1998. The 121st Brigade was within the Pashtrik/Pastrik subzone. [231] In the testimony of Jakup Krasniqi, the territory within the bounds of the 121st Brigade was not identical to the subzones before August 1998. [232] The fighting point in Kroimire/Krajmirovice became the Ruzhdi Selihu battalion, which was part of the 121st Brigade. [233] Ramiz Qeriqi was appointed commander of that battalion. [234] Within the Pashtrik/Pastrik operational zone, apart from the 121st Brigade, the 122nd to 127th Brigades were also formed. The Dukagjin zone had the 131st to 138th Brigades, the Shale zone had the 141st and 142nd Brigades. The Llap zone had the 151st to 153rd Brigades. The Nerodime/Nerodimlje zone had the 161st and 162nd Brigades. The Karadak zone had the 171st and 172nd Brigades. [235]

65. While the formation of Brigades and Battalions at various times in the second half of 1998 represents a further and significant stage in the progressive development of a more formalised and more typical military type structure by the KLA, it should not be imagined that they were descriptive of a body of soldiers of the numerical strengths typically to be found in Brigades and Battalions respectively of modern European armies. Many KLA Brigades and Battalions, when first formed, were little more than a shell to which soldiers were recruited or transferred at various times ; typically they comprised the existing KLA points in a given area. The rate of their growth in numbers of men appears to have varied considerably from place to place.

C. Taking of Llapushnik/Lapusnik by the KLA in May 1998
66. The village of Llapushnik/Lapusnik is located in Gllogovc/Glogovac municipality in central Kosovo. It lies in a gorge on both sides of the Peje/Pec-Prishtina/Pristina highway, which is one of the main roads connecting Prishtina/Pristina with the western parts of Kosovo, and with Albania. The Llapushnik/Lapusnik gorge was of strategic importance for the KLA: having control over the gorge provided the KLA with a corridor for the transportation of weapons and supplies from Albania and also enabled the free movement of citizens and soldiers. [236] The Llapushnik/Lapusnik gorge was also strategically important for the Serbian forces as it provided access to the villages bordering the Drenica zone, [237] as well as for preventing the KLA having the significant advantages just identified.

67. On 9 May 1998 Serbian forces attacked the villages in the Llapushnik/Lapusnik gorge including Llapushnik/Lapusnik, Komaran/Komorane and Krekova. [238] At about 0800 hours on 9 May 1998 Serbian police forces took positions at Gradines Guri, [239] a rock at Llapushnik/Lapusnik located south of the Peje/Pec-Prishtina/Pristina road, and at the village school from where they opened fire. [240] While the evidence is inconsistent as to the precise weapons used in the battle, it is clear from those present that the Serbian forces were far better equipped [241] and significantly outnumbered the KLA in the vicinity.

68. The fact of fighting in Llapushnik/Lapusnik soon became known in the nearby villages. Ruzhdi Karpuzi testified that on 8 May 1998, all other evidence indicates it was 9 May, from the village of Shale/Sedlare, located some nine km away from Llapushnik/Lapusnik, he heard shots, he thought coming from the direction of Komaran /Komorane and Nekoc/Nekovce. He went there and saw that fighting was taking place at Llapushnik/Lapusnik. [242] Ruzhdi Karpuzi went to the vicinity of the village of Kizhareke/Kisna Reka and from there took a route through the mountain to Llapushnik/Lapusnik. On his way he met five KLA members including Ymer Alushani, aka Voglushi, a KLA commander [243] from Komaran/Komorane, Enver Mulaku and Ramadan Zogu, who were fighting the Serbian forces. [244] Ruzhdi Karpuzi decided to join them and fought together with them on the Peje/Pec-Prishtina/Pristina road. [245]

69. Elmi Sopi said that on 9 May 1998 at about 1100 hours Ymer Alushani arrived at Llapushnik/Lapusnik with a group of seven or eight KLA soldiers. Elmi Sopi explained to him what was happening and directed the group to the house of Haxhi Gashi where some young men from the village who had hunting guns were gathered. [246] About an hour later a group of 16 soldiers descended from the mountains and Elmi Sopi's brother led them to the same house, from where the soldiers were led to the positions of the Serbian forces. [247] Elmi Sopi further testified that at about 1300 hours he heard a noise and saw black smoke rising after which he saw the Serbian forces withdrawing towards Komaran/Komorane. [248] He then went to the site where the fighting was and saw that a Serbian police " Pinzgauer" , an armoured personnel carrier, with a lot of ammunition, was in flames. [249]

70. Ramiz Qeriqi [250] and Fatmir Limaj [251] also testified that on 9 May 1998 during the battle at Llapushnik/Lapusnik they saw Ymer Alushani leading a group of 5-7 men who fought the Serbian forces on the Peje/Pec-Prishtina/Pristina.

71. It was the evidence of Fadil Kastrati that on 9 May 1998 he was in his home village of Blinaje/Lipovica (near Vershec/Vrsevce), [252] when he and some other men from his village were called to the house of Ymer Alushani [253] in Komaran/Komorane. Fadil Kastrati and his friends went on foot from Blinaje/Lipovica to Leletiq/Laletic, a little further from there they met Ymer Alushani with a group of men and continued together with them to Llapushnik/Lapusnik by car. [254] They arrived in Llapushnik/Lapusnik just before dusk and took positions at the rock located on the south side of the Peje/Pec-Prishtina/Pristina road where earlier that day the Serbian forces had been situated. [255]

72. The evidence of L64 describes similar events. In the afternoon of 9 May 1998 he was told that Ymer Alushani wanted him to go to Llapushnik/Lapusnik as fast as he could. At dusk L64 arrived at Ymer Alushani's house in Komaran/Komorane. Ymer himself arrived later, explained to L64 and other KLA soldiers who had gathered there that Serbian forces had attacked the villages in the Llapushnik/Lapusnik gorge, that he had gone there with some comrades upon hearing the first shots and that there had been fighting that continued until late in the afternoon. Ymer Alushani also told them to go to Llapushnik/Lapusnik before daylight. [256] L64 and the others set off on foot at about 0200 hours on 10 May 1998 and took positions at Big Guri, the rock situated on the south side of the Peje/Pec-Prishtina/Pristina road. [257] They waited there until midday on 10 May 1998. Serbian forces had not returned. L64 went to check the situation in Komaran/Komorane. [258]

73. In addition to the men who fought together with Ymer Alushani, other KLA members also came to assist in the battle at Llapushnik/Lapusnik. Ramiz Qeriqi testified that on 9 May 1998 from Klecke/Klecka he heard the sound of shots being fired coming from Llapushnik/Lapusnik and decided to go there to assist in the fight. [259] Three groups, each comprised of five KLA members, left from Klecke/Klecka to Llapushnik /Lapusnik. [260] Fatmir Limaj, Ramiz Qeriqi and Topi each led one of the three groups. [261] The group led by Fatmir Limaj left first. When the other two groups arrived at Llapushnik/Lapusnik, about 20 minutes after the group of Fatmir Limaj, the fighting was about to finish. A Serbian Pinzgauer was in flames. [262] Ramiz Qeriqi believed that the greatest success was scored by the KLA Pellumbi unit situated on the northern side of the Peje/Pec-Prishtina/Pristina road. [263]

74. The Accused Fatmir Limaj testified that on 9 May 1998 from Klecke/Klecka he intercepted radio communications between KLA members and, as the dialogue was incomprehensive, decided to find out what was going on. [264] Together with the Accused Isak Musliu, Sadik Shala, Nexhim Shalaand and Bardhi, Fatmir Limaj drove up to the Berishe/Berisa Mountains from where they saw several Serbian vehicles approaching the KLA forces at the village of Gjurgjice, which was situated next to Orlate. They also saw Serbian police forces firing from the northern side of the Peje/Pec-Prishtina/Pristina road. [265] Fatmir Limaj and his group decided to join the fighting, and leaving one of them to coordinate radio communications, they went down to the main road close to the place where the KLA members were fighting. They opened fire and shot at a Serbian Pinzgauer, which appeared to be loaded with ammunition. The Pinzgauer exploded and the Serbian forces withdrew in the direction of Drenica and Komaran/Komorane. [266]

75. The KLA were successful in resisting the Serbian attack at Llapushnik/Lapusnik on 9 May 1998 and the Serbian forces withdrew to their previously held positions in Komaran/Komorane. [267] On Fatmir Limaj's evidence, after the departure of the Serbian forces he and his group met the soldiers led by Ymer Alushani who had been fighting on the Gjurgjice-Llapushnik road and then returned to Klecke/Klecka. [268] The following day Ymer Alushani came to Klecke/Klecka, together with two civilians, and told Fatmir Limaj that the civilians in Llapushnik/Lapusnik were afraid that the Serbian forces would return and wanted them to go back to the village. [269] A group of KLA members went there voluntarily and a small unit was stationed in Llapushnik/Lapusnik. [270] This evidence is consistent with the evidence of Elmi Sopi who testified that after the withdrawal of the Serbian forces from Llapushnik/Lapusnik, the KLA soldiers wanted to leave but the people from Llapushnik/Lapusnik asked them to stay to protect them and offered to provide housing for them. [271] Ymer Alushani discussed this with his friends and soldiers were placed in the houses in Llapushnik/Lapusnik. [272]

76. While there are some inconsistencies in the evidence discussed above, inconsistencies primarily related to the time or the precise location of the described events, in the Chamber's view, the following has been established with respect to the taking of Llapushnik/Lapusnik by the KLA forces: In the morning of 9 May 1998 Serbian forces entered the Llapushnik/Lapusnik gorge. An exchange of fire between the Serbian forces and the KLA fighters and people of Llapushnik/Lapusnik broke out. At the sound of the shots Ymer Alushani from the nearby village of Komaran/Komorane sent people to other neighbouring villages to bring men who had joined or were willing to join, the KLA. Together with small KLA force from Komaran/Komorane they went to Llapushnik/Lapusnik. They took positions at the Peje/Pec-Prishtina/Pristina road and fought the Serbian forces there. Meanwhile information about the fighting reached KLA forces in Klecke/Klecka. Fatmir Limaj together with a total of about 15 men responded in Llapushnik/Lapusnik and joined the fight against the Serbian forces. In the early afternoon the Serbian Pinzgauer located in the middle of the village was hit and exploded. This appears to have caused the Serbian forces to withdraw. In the afternoon and the evening of 9 May 1998 more KLA fighters came to Llapushnik/Lapusnik. Following these events, at the request of the people in Llapushnik/Lapusnik village, KLA soldiers were positioned there and accommodated in various private houses in the village.

77. Immediately the KLA soldiers started to dig trenches and make other fortifications in Llapushnik/Lapusnik village. [273] The trenches were built at night with the help of some young people from the village. [274] The body of evidence establishes that from that time the KLA remained in Llapushnik/Lapusnik until 25 or 26 July 1998 when Serbian forces drove them from the village. In that period the strength of the KLA forces in the village and its vicinity grew considerably.

D. The fall of Llapushnik/Lapusnik in July 1998
78. The KLA lost control of Llapushnik/Lapusnik in a battle with Serbian forces which took place on 25 and 26 July 1998. In the evening of Friday, 24 July 1998, Serbian forces approached Llapushnik/Lapusnik on the Peje/Pec-Prishtina/Pristina road arriving from the direction of Prishtina/Pristina. [275] Elmi Sopi testified that at about 0400 hours on 25 July 1998 he received a phone call from a friend who informed him that a convoy of Serbian tanks and machinery was moving on the Peje/Pec-Prishtina/Pristina road. The convoy had stopped at the checkpoint in Komaran/Komorane. [276] Other Serbian forces positioned at Quake Komoranit, at the antenna of Radio Prishtina /Pristina in Komaran/Komorane, and at the chicken farm in Krajkove/Krajkovo, also had set off towards the Llapsuhnik/Lapusnik gorge. [277]

79. In the early morning of 25 July 1998 the Serbian forces opened fire on the KLA positions in Llapsuhnik/Lapusnik. [278] The Serbian forces were equipped with " Katyusha" rockets and 220 mm cannons. [279] About 140 Serbian tanks were involved in the operation. [280] Special MUP units, two detachments of 200 men each, and an anti-terrorist unit participated in the Serbian offensive at Llapushnik/Lapusnik. [281] Some evidence suggests that surface-to-surface rockets, mine launchers and " chemical poisons" were also used in the Serbian offensive at Llapushnik/Lapusnik. [282] The KLA forces were equipped with 60 mm, 82 mm as well as some 150 mm mortars. [283] They also made use of the trenches and other fortifications that had been built in the village earlier. [284]

80. The fighting continued the entire day of 25 July and on 26 July 1998. In the evening of 25 July 1998 the Serbian forces moved closer and the KLA started to withdraw. [285] The Serbian tanks were firing at the KLA positions. The KLA responded with mortar fire. At least on one occasion the KLA managed to hit a Serbian tank. [286] However, the KLA forces were unable to stand-up to the strength of the Serbian attack and, on 26 July, all KLA forces withdrew from Llapushnik/Lapusnik. [287] Ymer Alushani, a KLA leader, was killed in this battle. [288]

81. In addition, on 26 July 1998 virtually the entire population of Llapushnik/ Lapusnik moved from the gorge to the Berishe/Berisa Mountains, especially to the villages of Negroc/Negrovce, Arlat/Orlate, and Terpeze/Trpeza. [289] Zeqir Gashi testified that he and the nurses working at his clinic fled to the village of Berishe/Berisa and from there to the village of Fshati-i-Ri/Novosel. [290] On Elmi Sopi's evidence, only some old people who could not leave remained in their houses, where later they were killed by the Serbian forces. [291]

82. The Chamber will discuss the ramifications of the fall of Llapushnik/Lapusnik for the individuals detained at the prison compound later in this decision. [292]


See Articles 1, 2 and 4 of the SFRY Constitution of 1974.
See Articles 1, 147, 240, 291-293 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia of 1974.
73. Exhibit P201, pá17; Fatmir Limaj, Tá5862.
74. Exhibit P201, pá17; Fatmir Limaj, Tá5862, 5865.
See also Fadil Bajraktari, Tá6888.
75. Exhibit P201, pá17; Fatmir Limaj, Tá5862-5863.
76. Exhibit P201, pá17; Fatmir Limaj, Tá5865.
See Exhibit P201, pá17.
78. Exhibit P201, pá17.
79. Exhibit P201, pá17; Shukri Buja, Tá3727-3729; Elmi Sopi, Tá6713-6715; Dr Zeqir Gashi, 5665; Fatmir Limaj, Tá5866 -5868. Exhibit P178, pá1; Exhibit DM12, parasá8 and 9.
80. Exhibit P201, pá18.
81. Dr Zeqir Gashi, Tá5598-5560; Fatmir Limaj, 5866-5868.
See also Exhibit P201, pá56.
82. Exhibit P201, pá18.
83. Ruzhdi Karpuzi, Tá3056-3057; Sylejman Selimi, Tá2058-2059; Fatmir Limaj, Tá5866 ; Exhibit P197, paraá8; Exhibit DM12, parasá17-22.
84. Exhibit P201, pá18;
See also Fatmir Limaj, Tá5866.
85. Exhibit P210, pá18.
86. Fatmir Limaj, Tá5866-5867.
87. Exhibit P201, pá50.
See also Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3298; Ramadan Behluli Tá2653.
88. Shukri Buja, Tá3724.
89. Shukri Buja, Tá3731.
90. Shukri Buja, Tá3731.
See also Ramiz Qeriqi, Tá3554-3556.
See infra, paraá48.
92. Shukri Buja, Tá3732.
93. Exhibit P201, pá18; Fatmir Limaj, Tá5875-5876.
94. Fatmir Limaj, Tá5876-5877; Exhibit P201, pá18.
95. Fatmir Limaj, Tá5881; Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3296.
96. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3293.
97. Fatmir Limaj, Tá5881.
98. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3294-3296.
99. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3306-3307.
100. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3306-3307.
101. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3296.
See Rexhep Selimi, Tá6592 ; Shukri Buja, Tá3732.
103. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3303-3304.
See also Sylejman Selimi, Tá2058-2060.
104. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3307.
See Jakup Krasniqi, Tá 3297; Fatmir Limaj, Tá5884-5886.
See John Crosland, Tá1864. See also Fatmir Limaj, Tá6200.
107. Fatmir Limaj, Tá6129-6130; 6200 -6205; Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3430-3431.
108. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3314-3315.
109. The fighting in both Rahovec/ Orahovac and Bardhi i Madh/Veliki Belacevac for the Obliq/Obilic mine started without the authorisation of the General Staff of the KLA, Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3415-3417, which may imply that usually military operations of this type required the authorisation of the General Staff.
See infra, paras 94-104.
111. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3305.
112. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3305-3306.
113. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3309-3310.
114. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3309-3310.
115. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3310-3311.
116. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3310-3311.
See also Rexhep Selimi, Tá6587-6588.
117. Jakup Krasiqi, Tá3310.
118. Shukri Buja, Tá3727-3729; Exhibit P197, paraá11.
119. Jan Kickert, Tá659.
See Shukri Buja, Tá3727.
See Fatmir Limaj, Tá5886 -5888. See also Ramadan Behluli, Tá2648-2651, 2874-2876.
122. Fatmir Limaj, Tá5882-5883; Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3298-3299.
See, for example, Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3303-3305; Fatmir Limaj, Tá5882-5883.
124. Fatmir Limaj, 6120.
125. Fatmir Limaj, 6120; Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3301-3303; Ramadan Behluli, Tá2654-2655.
126. Shukri Buja, Tá3732.
See also Ramadan Behluli, Tá2654-2655; Ruzhdi Karpuzi, Tá3223.
127. Exhibit P212, tab 5, pá18.
128. Exhibit P212, tab 5, pá18.
129. Exhibit P212, tab 5, pá18.
130. Exhibit P212, tab 5, pp 18, 27; Sylejman Selimi, Tá2063-2064; Rexhep Selimi, Tá6592.
See also John Crosland, Tá1858-1860; Exhibit P92, tab 2.
131. John Crosland, Tá1863.
132. Exhibit P212, tab 5, 18.
See also Jan Kickert, Tá758-760.
133. John Crosland, Tá1863.
134. Exhibit P212, tab 5, 18. Jan Kickert believed that there were 10 children and 18 women among the casualties, Tá758-759.
135. Exhibit P212, tab 5, pp 18, 23; Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3301-3303.
136. Peter Bouckaert, Tá5555-5556 ; Exhibit P212, tab 5, pá31.
137. John Crosland, Tá1863.
138. Exhibit P212, tab 5, ppá20-21.
139. Exhibit P212, tab 5, pá18; Peter Boukaert, Tá5516-5517.
140. Jaqup Krasniqi testified that the funeral of the victims in Likoshan/Likosane and Qirez/Cirez was attended by 200á000 people, Tá3301-3303, 3386-3370.
See also Peter Bouckaert, Tá5516.
141. Jaqup Krasniqi, Tá3368-3370; 3305-3306; Exhibit P141.
142. Sylejman Selimi, Tá2067, 2198 ; Rexhep Selimi,T 6592; Ruzhdi Karpuzi, Tá3223; Fadil Kastrati, Tá2590, 2622; Jan Kickert, Tá720; Peter Boukaert Tá5516-5517; Shukri Buja, Tá3734-3735; Fatmir Limaj, Tá5901-5903.
143. Fatmir Limaj, Tá5908-5909, 5919 ; Shukri Buja, Tá3738-3739.
144. Fatmir Limaj, Tá5907; Shukri Buja, Tá3739-3740.
145. Fatmir Limaj, Tá5910-5911.
146. Shukri Buja, Tá3739-3741.
147. Peter Boukaert, Tá5516-5517.
148. Peter Boukaert, Tá5516-5517.
149. Shukri Buja, Tá3746-3749; 3751 -3752. For the location of various places referred to in this section,
see AnnexesáII and III.
150. Shukri Buja, Tá4092-4093; Rexhep Selimi, Tá6593-6594.

151. Shukri Buja, Tá3756; 3761.
152. Ramiz Qeriqi, Tá3563; 3565-3566 ; Shukri Buja, Tá3812.
153. Shukri Buja, Tá3928.
154. Shukri Buja, Tá3794; 3812.
155. Shukri Buja, Tá3768-3769.
156. Shukri Buja, Tá3768-3769; 3772.
157. Shukri Buja, Tá3777.
158. Ramiz Qeriqi, Tá3577.
159. Ramadan Behluli, Tá2659-2660.
160. Ramadan Behluli, Tá2661-2663 ; Ramiz Qeriqi, Tá3575.
161. Ramiz Qeriqi, Tá3575.
162. Shukri Buja, Tá3777-3778.
163. Shukri Buja, Tá3777-3781.
164. Ramadan Behluli, Tá2659-2660 ; 2666.
165. Ramiz Qeriqi, Tá3578.
166. Ramadan Behluli, Tá2667.
167. Shukri Buja, Tá3789.
See infra, para 702.
169. Sylejman Selimi, Tá2070-2072 ; The terms " zone" and " subzone" are used interchangeably in this decision, reflecting the actual evidence. Jakup Krasniqi stated that these two terms mean the same; Tá3479.
170. Sylejman Selimi, Tá2072-2075.
171. Sylejman Selimi, Tá2075-2076.
172. Rexhep Selimi, Tá6691.
173. Shukri Buja, Tá3769-3772.
174. Sylejman Selimi, Tá2188.
175. Shukri Buja, Tá3773-3774.
176. Rexhep Selimi, Tá6594-6595.
See infra, paras 76 and 77.
178. Ramiz Qeriqi, Tá3573.
See infra, paras 156 and 157.
180. Bislim Zyrapi, Tá6825.
181. Shukri Buja, Tá3989; Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3479-3482.
182. Fatmir Limaj, Tá5963.
183. Exhibit P49; English translation - Exhibit P48, páU0038573.
184. Rexhep Selimi, Tá6651-6652.
185. Rexhep Selimi, Tá6687-6688.
186. Rexhep Selimi, Tá6599; 6601- 6602.
See infra, para 64.
188. Fatmir Limaj, Tá5963; Shukri Buja, Tá4097.
189. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3479-3482; Rexhep Selimi, Tá6687-6688.
190. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3479-3482.
191. Exhibit P121, pá22-23.
192. Ramadan Behluli, Tá2770-2771.
193. L95, Tá4217-4218; 4286-4287.
194. L95, Tá4203-4212.
See infra, para 593.
196. Shukri Buja, Tá3797.
197. Shukri Buja, Tá3795-3796.
198. Shukri Buja, Tá3798; Ramiz Qeriqi, Tá3594; Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3479-3482.
199. Shukri Buja, Tá3988.
200. Shukri Buja, Tá4153-4155.
201. Shukri Buja, Tá4153-4155; Sylejman Selimi, Tá2148-2150.
202. Ramadan Behluli, Tá2682-2684 ; Exhibit P119.
203. L95, Tá4220-4221.
204. Bislim Zyrapi, Tá6834-6835.
205. Exhibit P4, image 8; Ole Lehtinen, Tá461-463.
206. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3341-3345; 3471-3475; 3488-3491.
207. Fatmir Limaj, Tá5964-5967; 6575 -6576; Exhibit DL7.
208. Shukri Buja, Tá3796.
See the preceding paragraph.
210. Exhibit 1, map 10; Sylejman Selimi, Tá2178-2179; Exhibit 1, map 4.
211. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3403-3404; L64, Tá4378-4385; Exhibit P170.
212. Prosecution Final Brief, footnote 143.
213. L64, Tá4533-4534; Peter Boukaert, Tá5578.
214. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3415-3417; 3486-3488.
See infra, parasá78-82.
216. Ramadan Behluli, Tá2818-2821.
217. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3482-3484.
218. Exhibit P212, tab 3, pá16; Peter Bouckaert, Tá5582.
219. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3468-3470.
220. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3479-3482.
221. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3479-3482.
222. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3479-3482.
223. Ramiz Qeriqi, Tá3692; Bislim Zyrapi, Tá6824.
224. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3479-3482.
225. Sylejman Selimi, Tá2076-2078 ; Rexhep Selimi, Tá6601-6602.
226. Shukri Buja, Tá3989; Bislim Zyrapi, Tá6831-6832.
227. Fatmir Limaj, Tá6012; 6014-6017 ; 6088.
228. Ramadan Behluli, Tá2765-2766.
229. Rexhep Selimi, Tá6674.
230. Exhibit P155; Ramiz Qeriqi, Tá3593.
231. Shukri Buja, Tá4152-4153.
232. Jakup Krasniqi, Tá3488.
233. Ramadan Behluli, Tá2891-2892.
234. Ramiz Qeriqi, Tá3593; 3668; Exhibit P155.
235. Rexhep Selimi, Tá6601-6602.
236. Sylejman Selimi, Tá2091-2095, 2147. Bislim Zyrapi testified that Llapusnik/Lapusnik was an important position for the KLA because the Llapusnik/Lapusnik gorge was a place from where the Pristina -Peje road could be blocked, Tá6856.
See also Bislim Zyrapi, Tá6858. Exhibit P44, an interview with Fatmir Limaj states: " The maintaining of the strait of Lapusnik for our army and people has had special significance because this strait increased the importance of our army. This strait made it possible to transport the people and to arm them on a massive level and it became the organic linking point for the liberated territories."
237. Sylejman Selimi, Tá2091-2095, Tá2150-2152.
238. Sylejman Selimi, Tá2091.
See also L64, Tá4345.
239. Elmi Sopi, Tá6720-6721.
240. Elmi Sopi, Tá6720-6721.
241. On Elmi Sopi's evidence a helicopter of the Serbian forces was flying above the village (T 6721), while others testified that during the battle at Llapushnik the Serbian forces used artillery and other heavy weapon, Ruzhdi Karpuzi, Tá3064; Fadil Kastrati, Tá2594; Ramiz Qeriqi, Tá3569 -3571.
242. Ruzhdi Karpuzi, Tá3062-3063, 3225.
243. L64 testified that Ymer Alushani was the commander of the Zjarri unit, Tá4335.

244. Ruzhdi Karpuzi, Tá3063-3065.
245. Ruzhdi Karpuzi, Tá3063-3065.
246. Elmi Sopi, Tá6721.
247. Elmi Sopi, Tá6721-6722.
248. Elmi Sopi, Tá6722.
249. Elmi Sopi, Tá6722.
250. Ramiz Qeriqi, Tá3569-3571.
251. Fatmir Limaj, Tá5940.
252. Fadil Kastrati, Tá2631-2632.
253. Fadil Kastrati, Tá2591-2592.
254. Fadil Kastrati, Tá2632.
255. Fadil Kastrati, Tá2592-2593.
256. L64, Tá4344-4345.
257. L64, Tá4349-4350.
258. L64, Tá4350.
259. Ramiz Qeriqi, Tá3568.
260. Ramiz Qeriqi, Tá3568.
261. Ramiz Qeriqi, Tá3568.
262. Ramiz Qeriqi, Tá3568-3569.
263. Ramiz Qeriqi, Tá3568-3571.
264. Fatmir Limaj, Tá5936.
265. Fatmir Limaj, Tá5936-5937, 6075.
266. Fatmir Limaj, Tá5937-5938.
267. Ramiz Qeriqi, Tá3571.
268. Fatmir Limaj, Tá5940.
269. Fatmir Limaj, Tá5940-5941.
270. Fatmir Limaj, Tá5941.
271. Elmi Sopi, Tá6722-6723.
272. Elmi Sopi, Tá6722-6723.
273. Ruzhdi Karpuzi, Tá3068-3069; Elmi Sopi, Tá6723-6725.
274. Elmi Sopi, Tá6725, 6733.
275. Ruzhdi Karpuzi, Tá3211-3213; Elmi Sopi, Tá6736.
276. Elmi Sopi, Tá6736.
277. Elmi Sopi, Tá6736.
278. L64, Tá4551-4552; Dr Zeqir Gashi, Tá5632; Elmi Sopi, Tá6736.
279. Elmi Sopi, Tá6736; Exhibit P44 and Ole Lehtinen, Tá576-579.
280. Elmi Sopi, Tá6736; Exhibit P44 and Ole Lehtinen, Tá576-579.
281. Philip Coo, Tá5734-5736;.
282. Ruzhdi Karpuzi testified that the Serbian forces used blue shells, which made the soldiers drowsy, Tá3221-3223.
See also Exhibit P44, Ole Lehtinen, Tá576-579.
283. Philip Coo, Tá5734-5736; Elmi Sopi, Tá6736-6737.
284. Philip Coo, Tá5734-5736;
See also supra, para 77.
285. Ruzhdi Karpuzi, Tá3211-3213; Elmi Sopi, Tá6736.
286. Ruzhdi Karpuzi, Tá3213-3214.
287. Elmi Sopi, Tá6736; Ruzhdi Karpuzi, Tá3214; L64, Tá4553.
288. Dr Zeqir Gashi, Tá5635; L64, Tá4555-4556; Fatmir Limaj, Tá5989.
289. Elmi Sopi, Tá6736; 6761-6762.
290. Dr Zeqir Gashi, Tá5632-5635.
291. Elmi Sopi, Tá6761-6762.
See infra, paras 447- 507.

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